Hurriyet daily, by HOVHANNES NIKOGHOSYAN -- Since the very beginning, all advocates have been actively pushing parties not to lose momentum. Between Zurich in October 2009 and the Armenian Constitutional Court ruling this Jan. 12, it seemed we were at the positive end of this particular process and somewhere in the middle of normalization – in a broader perspective. Now, considering official statements and personal observations, Turkish leadership (whether at Çankaya Palace, the Prime Ministry or the General Staff) speaks in favor of the process itself but not of the results.

The Turkish foreign minister, the “new Kissinger” as he has been labeled recently, Ahmet Davutoğlu, said on March 15 at the Grand Assembly's Foreign Affairs Commission, “Presently, the protocols are a critical tool [for Turkey]. We use these documents as deterrents.” Days after, on March 19, even the biggest optimist - Armenian President Serge Sarkisian – was interviewed by Euronews, saying a positive vote in the Turkish Parliament would be “a miracle.”

The common language of all commentators on this point argues that we are in an impasse. A few days ago I badly missed a chance to pose two questions to U.S. Undersecretary of State Phil Gordon, who has been managing this issue for a long time. Those were about a) if the Obama administration saw “April 24” as a deadline for ratification and b) if he felt his prediction of a “fading partnership with Turkey” made in a book called “Winning Turkey” in 2008 became true under the light of PM Erdoğan’s refusal to attend a nuclear summit in April.

The Obama administration has had five major foreign policy strategies since taking the office – a "reset" with Russia, the Iranian nuclear dossier, the Afghanistan and Iraq issues, the Arab-Israeli never-ending charade and recovering relations with Turkey. So far all of them have had no tangible result. Even a major scandal occurred during Vice President Biden's trip to Israel. While Turkey still has a test to pass, it will be a "recovery" for previous failures.

On a news service aired all over the world, Turkish PM Erdoğan announced he is ready to get rid of 100,000 Armenian labor migrants (though the estimations are different), and as pro-Dashnak TV channel in Armenia coined it, “he failed in his own trap” by exaggerating the numbers before. No doubt, these remarks to the BBC had a shocking effect to all those involved in the talks. Like Mr. Mehmet Ali Birand, whose thoughts I had a chance to comment on before, I could not believe my ears when I heard the news. I cannot agree with Birand more when he says it’s in Turkey’s best interest to proceed further with the protocols as “there is no alternative way with this.”

Even ANCA’s comments say these documents are the best “tools” to fight genocide resolutions elsewhere. Obviously, it was not the best way to silence the genocide recognition campaign and opponents domestically. Perhaps this statement will also silence voices in the Armenian Parliament who recently were openly discussing ratification of the protocols before Turkey.

Professor Taner Akçam wrote in his letter to PM Erdoğan on March 13, and I also want to say here, hopefully the incumbent leadership in Turkey has distinguished itself from the Unionists (İttihatçılar) who committed the horrible crime against humanity in 1915 and hope Prime Minister Erdoğan does not plan to pull the illegal migrants out of the country through the now-Syrian desert of Deir ez-Zor (Deyrizor in Turkish).

Armenia plays this big game, relying on the support of her ad hoc allies in the EU, Russia and the United States – having no other option to exercise pressure on Turkey for any progress except for calling on international support and appealing to "reason" (e.g. "No closed borders in Europe in the 21st century," etc). Perhaps this is the best interpretation of positions taken after quite proactive trips and statements made by President Sarkisian and his fellow advisers since February. The last attempts came again with Le Figaro and Euronews: “I believe the international community should clearly articulate its position on that issue.”

Coming back to the U.S. House Committee vote, which is at stake now, we need to address it more as blackmail to Turkey to proceed with rapprochement rather than a real policy undertaking. I suppose the reaction from Turkey was stronger that was anticipated in Washington. On the other hand, both sides realize there is a certain line either of the parties will not be ready to cross. For instance, Turkey will stop support in Afghanistan or close the İncirlik base and side with terrorists. That’s nonsense. Turkey is too dependent upon American transnational corporations and the IMF/WB to do that.

And nowadays some analysts tend to forget last year's presidential statement on April 24, where Obama did utter the “G-word” in his message, and perhaps he did it in a better way, introducing the new label of “Meds Yeghern,” which is the common definition of the 1915 events in Armenian.

Recently I was having a very interesting debate on these matters with an elder colleague of mine who is sort of an "insider." In the discourse I managed to misuse the term "zero problems with neighbors policy," coined by professor Davutoğlu and used “zero-sum policy” twice. Now I think it was not a mistake if we pay attention to the developments with the Kurdish opening, Cyprus issue and the protocols ….

All in all, I see three very different go-ahead strategies looming over the process (the available exit-strategies I presented in the previous contribution). The first one is the ratification and the follow-up as described in the protocols – becoming extremely unlikely. An alternative to this is a small-scale political-military clash in Nagorno–Karabagh, an extremely unwanted scenario either for regional stability or for major players in the region. Perhaps the smell of war in the air pushed President Sarkisian to appeal to Azerbaijani leadership to sign "an agreement not to use force," which was immediately rejected by a foreign ministry official Elhan Poluhov in Baku. The statesman applied to the "right to restore territorial integrity," which obviously means a new war in the region. The history of Europe proves that a war against an immediate neighbor is impossible to win.

While the sides now evidently are failing to accomplish what had been agreed and signed in win-win documents, the third way, which sounds more likely at the moment, is to establish diplomatic relations beyond the protocols by April 24, institutionalizing the discussion between states and leaving aside the mediation. Thus, Turkey could silence the criticism of the international community and the Armenian president can regain the support of his one-time fellows. By the way, this was also the suggestion of Foreign Minister Davutoğlu in a recent statement made in Sofia, Bulgaria.

In the end, no matter what has happened, the reasons Armenia and Turkey publicized the negotiations and are now engaged in public debate are still valid. Turkey wants “zero problems,” regional weight and a European image. For Armenia, ironically, Turkey is the best way toward Europe. As said, let's hope "zero problems" will not turn into a "zero-sum" policy.

Hovhannes Nikoghosyan is a visiting fellow with the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies.